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ABSTRACT
There is an ongoing debate about SMEs and their innovative
capacity, against the background of the emerging European system.
SMEs are expected to face a new, more complex environment. Due to
their heterogeneity, they will eventually develop a large variety of
transition (or adaptation) patterns.
The paper presents a case study, using the data from a high-
tech French SME. A well accepted idea is that, when firms face new
problems, in general, before experimenting with new strategies, they
rely on well-known solutions and methods of problem solving. Only
when the methods prove to be insufficient, a radical change may take
place. The case study shows, indeed, that when confronted with a
challenge (i.e., designing temperature sensors for a new European
rocket engine), the managers first tried the routine solutions, before
finding out more inventive strategies.
The different stages of the innovation are analysed here as a
process of transition and of organisational change. The technical
challenge of the task helped this ‘learning organisation’ to deal with
risk, uncertainty, and complexity. Once the experience proved to be
successful, the staff gained confidence, and the managers became
more aggressive. This is the ‘cultural change’ that helped them to
take advantage of European programmes.2
INTRODUCTION
SMEs operating in Europe may have an ambiguous
perception of the European Union (EU). The EU provides an
opportunity to share resources, information, competencies; however,
it is also a source of uncertainty as new strategies and structures are
to be created to face the new constraints
1. On the one hand, SMEs are
willing to learn to compete in larger markets, to deal with more
diversified partners, to meet universities, research centres and big
companies. Very often, SMEs are involved in such a context through
European programmes. On the other hand, European funding and
subsidies still concern basically the large firms. Thus, SMEs offer,
both a picture of strength and weakness. They are more flexible, and
they create 66 per cent of total employment in EU. However, they
lack human and material resources to adapt to new markets, to
maintain niche markets, or to innovate.
SMEs constitute only 32 per cent of all participants in
European programmes. A total of 13,000 SMEs have been involved
in the 4
th Framework Programme. The French Minister of Education,
Research and Technology recently stated that it is important to
benefit from EU programmes. In response, the French government
took action to enhance SME’s contribution to R&D and innovation
2.
Still,  SMEs are very heterogeneous, and therefore, only a few of
them will be able to adapt to the emerging European system.
Gathering more data on SMEs during this transition period is crucial.
Surveys of samples have been used frequently to study  SMEs.
However, they only provide a snapshot (Blackburn and Jennings
1996, p. 5). Longitudinal studies would be useful, if not for their
                                                          
1 Various aspects of these issues are discussed in: Dodgson and Bessant
1996, Etzkowitz 1998, Garcia and Sanz-Menéndez, eds. 1998, Laredo 1998,
Revue Française de Géoéconomie’s Special Issue (Technological Battle in
the XXIst Century) Winter 1998-99, Rothwell and Dodgson 1992, Pike et
al. 1994, Sharp 1998.
2 See the interviews with Edith Cresson and Claude Allègre in the special
issue of Revue Française de Géoéconomie. Winter 1998-99.3
expense in time and money. Case studies are probably the best
choice for three reasons: (1) they have none of the disadvantages of
the previous methods; (2) they are easier to be conducted by
individual researchers; and, (3) they are more appropriate to the
study of transition periods, when the questions the investigator will
more frequently ask are ‘why’ and ‘how’ (Yin, 1989).
This paper presents a case study of a French SME who
designed and processed temperature sensors for the Vulcain engine
(developed for the European launcher  Ariane V by SEP,  Société
Européenne de Propulsion). The company, that I will refer to as
Allcapt, specialises in the design, development, manufacturing and
marketing of measurement systems and sensors for aerospace, space,
and defence industries, as well as for nuclear and marine
applications, and for process industries, in general.  Allcapt’s
customers are well-known large firms such as Air Liquide, Airbus,
Alcatel, Matra Marconi Space, Rolls Royce, SEP (now a division of
SNECMA), and SNECMA. The company’s plant operates in (AB), a
medium-sized town situated in a region in the central part of France
which is a region designated as being in ‘industrial decline’ (referred
to as ‘Objective 2 region’ by the EU).  Allcapt is very actively
involved either in European programmes, or in regional programmes
targeted by the EU to stimulate local industrial recovery.
The aim of the present study is to answer the following
questions: How Allcapt came to adopt new strategies focusing first
on innovation and, second, on participation in European
programmes? How  Allcapt evaluated these strategies? More
generally,  Allcapt’s experience, combined with similar studies of
other SMEs, may also contribute to an understanding of obstacles
and factors of change. Comparative methods are indeed useful when
similarities and differences in various patterns of adaptation are to be
identified. They also may help the progressive development of new
concepts and new theoretical approaches, where the paucity of
empirical studies is a limitation.
To deal with Allcapt’s case, I conducted semi-structured in-
depth interviews in 1996-97 and again, in 1999, representing a total
of 18-hours of tape-recorded data. As usual, anonymity of people,
places and companies is protected in the paper. In 1996-97, the4
Aerospace Equipment Division Vice-President (hereafter  AED
manager), the  Industrial manager  of (AB) plant, the Deputy-
production manager, who now is the production manager (hereafter
Production manager), and the Materials manager who is working
for the R&D unit and who reports to the technical manager
  was
interviewed twice. Both the Production manager and the Materials
manager were interviewed a third time, in 1999. In May 1999, I also
interviewed a Project manager working at (AB) plant since 1998,
and the  Technical manager, who is also in charge of European
programmes. As part of my fieldwork, I organised one visit to the
company’s headquarters in the Paris area, and three visits to the (AB)
plant (two visits to the old plant and one visit to the new one, as in
1998 Allcapt moved to this larger plant situated in the same town), to
observe people working or interacting, and to have informal
discussions with the staff.
In the following, I will first briefly present the history of
Allcapt. The innovation challenges and accomplishments of Allcapt
will be described in the second section. They are identified as a
period of transition. The third section will analyse the company’s
new culture, and the factors that contributed to the radical
transformation of Allcapt. To deal with both of these aspects, in my
presentation of this case study, I prefer to draw upon  Allcapt
employees’ perception of change, as this is part of the company’s
culture. In that way, the original data presented in this paper will be
more useful to those who seek published secondary data. As a
sociologist, my contribution has been to propose an interpretation of
this experience, using well-known sociological concepts, in order to
set the framework within which Allcapt employees’ perceptions can
be understood. This is necessary if one wishes to make sense of
unstructured, dispersed information and data.5
PRESENTATION OF ALLCAPT
Allcapt and the (AB) plant to process industrial sensors, were
founded in 1960 by an engineer
3.In 1965, in order to benefit from
lower labour costs in Spain, a subsidiary (hereafter referred to as
Icapto) was created in Madrid. In 1967, Allcapt acquired a licence
from a company in order to enter the nuclear power industry that was
expected to expand as a result of the new French energy policy.
Before retiring in 1972, the owner sold the company to an American
holding. In 1975,  Allcapt was organised in three divisions:
Aerospace division, nuclear division, and systems and sensors
division for marine applications:
‘Diversification has always been one of our assets. We
developed our aerospace division thanks to the benefits
coming from the nuclear division, and with the booming of
aerospace activities nowadays, we have more opportunity for
R&D’ (Production manager).
In 1972,  Allcapt was contracted by SNECMA to process
temperature sensors (thermocouples) licensed by an American
company. Allcapt created two joint-ventures in Russia, in 1988 and
in 1995. In 1993, Allcapt acquired a company that specialised in
                                                          
3 The origins of the company go back to the end of the 19
th century when an
engineer created a family business that manufactured threshing and other
steam machines. After WWII, the plant was moved to (AB) and was
specialised in metal cutting and produced mainly screws for automotive
industry. The engineer who created Allcapt is the grand son of the founder.
Before being united, the old and the new plants co-existed for some time at
(AB).6
pressure transducers. More recently, in 1997, a US company
that specialised in fluid regulators was acquired by Allcapt, together
with the pressure product line of a French company
4.
When the economic recession hit the company, between
1986-93,  Allcapt fired 70 employees. An important recruitment
campaign took place in 1993, and, since then, the number of
employees has grown continuously due to the strength of the
Aerospace Equipment Division (AED) and to the recent acquisition
of the above mentioned companies. Today, the company has 18
service networks in France as well as abroad, to compete in global
markets.
In this paper, I will focus on the AED, the most important
and rapidly expanding division of the company, with a turnover of
US $ 50 Million (projection 1998-99), representing 63.5 per cent of
the total turnover. AED currently has 340 employees which is more
than the total number of employees of Allcapt in 1994 (317). Very
recently, Allcapt recruited a human resources manager. The division
employs 115 production workers, and 60 engineers and technicians
at the (AB) plant. The role of R&D increased rapidly in areas such as
high temperature and cryogenic ceramics and ultraviolet pyrometers.
The Search for Security and Excellence
During the initial stages of the company’s development,
Allcapt’s management drew heavily on networking and personal
knowledge to reduce uncertainty and risk. Indeed, ‘SNECMA sub-
contracted Allcapt mainly because its founder graduated from the
same engineering school as several of their managers’ (Production
manager). For years, the company operated in a very comfortable
(almost routine) context with this friendly customer. This period is
named by the managers ‘ the mono-customer period’.  Allcapt
                                                          
4 Since very recently, due to these latest acquisition, the number of total
staff reached 600 persons, that is slightly over the limit of an SME, but an
important number of the employees operate in the US, a few in other
countries such as Russia and Spain.7
processed thermocouples for the Atar engines of Mirage IV aircrafts.
The  Industrial manager states that ‘SNECMA furnished the
drawings and all the details on the conception’, before adding: ‘We
only had to follow them’.
Nevertheless, the processing of sensors requires a certain
degree of tacit skill and know-how. Thus; the company’s main
concern has been to create an environment that allows employees to
develop the necessary skills and a ‘ culture of individual and
collective responsibility’. Even the official propaganda was stressing
the craft dimension of Allcapt’s production operations: ‘Processing
temperature sensors is Allcapt’s main craft (métier)’.
The production workers and operators are called
‘compagnons’, which refers to highly skilled craft people producing
unique products. This linguistic choice is important. Not only does it
stress the role of experience
5, manual dexterity and practical and tacit
knowledge
6, but also individual responsibility for every stage of the
process:
‘We want our people to understand the importance of
following exactly the instructions indicated by the
Engineering unit. They have to be conscious of the fact that
we are producing ‘a five-legged sheep’. Everything is ‘in the
hands’ of our compagnons. If the worker accepts that each of
his/her actions, movements, or decisions will impact the final
product, s/he will not, for example, twist a wire with more
strength than is required, assuming one cannot detect it’
(Industrial manager).
                                                          
5 As put by the Industrial manager :‘Experience is important, as we are
learning by doing, rather than exclusively relying on R&D results. Only
experience could teach people, for example, that if the thermal treatment of
the material is done during a specific stage, this will cause a lengthening of
its lifetime’.
6 For this concept, see: Polanyi 1958, 1966.8
Knowledge Creation and Management
As  Allcapt’s main challenge is to manufacture reliable
sensors, workers’ craft, skill and knowledge are considered the
company’s most important assets. Competence building has been one
of Allcapt’s initial challenges. When the plant opened, the company
recruited people from other companies and trained them further. To
handle the very tiny wires used for the sensors, patience and
precision are so important that the company preferred to hire women
who, previously, had been employed in the textile plants of the area,
as the textile industry began to de-localise its operations to low-wage
countries in the 1970s
7:
‘The company completed their training by providing them
with some basic knowledge concerning the principles of
electricity, the reading and interpretation of the
measurements provided by the instrumentation, and of the
drawings provided by the engineering unit’ ( Industrial
manager).
For more complex operations, people from technical schools
were recruited and initiated to the job by senior workers, technicians
and engineers. After a period of training and on-the-job experience,
the production staff was evaluated and assigned to existing positions
in production and technical operations according to their results. This
method was, according to the Industrial manager, ‘very costly and
inefficient, because the workers would acquire new skills only after
many years of employment’.
                                                          
7 See Bagla-Gökalp 1990, 1993.9
More recently, Allcapt’s managers considered that the best
solution would be to create their own school with a more adapted
curriculum. The industrial manager made every effort to
communicate the relevance of such a project. As soon as the Ministry
of education accepted the project, Allcapt proposed a policy called
‘qualification contracts’ to those who applied for technical positions.
While employing these young persons on a part-time basis, Allcapt
provides them a two-year education programme, for a total of 900
hours, and eventually hire them according to their performance. In
1997, when the experience began, they represented 40 per cent of
AED’s operators.
Internal Communication: A Precondition for Quality
In the 1980s, the new Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
emphasised the importance of internal communication and of shared
values. As a symbol of the strong culture of responsiveness and
communication, the CEO created open areas to allow people to meet
easily to solve problems and to facilitate the circulation of
information. He changed the internal organisation and architecture of
the (AB) plant, to make managers easy to reach:
‘Our  compagnons working with the drawings and
instructions of our engineers must be able to inform them if
things don’t work as expected. If they err, they should be
able to inform their boss, even if the error is not detectable.
To this end, an adapted structure to enhance relevant
communication patterns and good human relations, is
necessary’ (Industrial manager).
An efficient means of internal communication is perceived at
Allcapt not only as a key factor for processing reliable and accurate
sensors, but also for accelerating product development:10
‘Communication is also important in order to save time. If
you have a problem while you are developing a product, you
should be able to go and ask your neighbour who may
already have the solution. Communication must be a part of
our culture’ (Production manager).
When communication is at stake, the project manager is a
pivotal person. In charge of the development of several products, the
project manager is the co-ordinator of all aspects of the project,
including the units such as the prototype shop, the quality unit, and
also the sales and marketing divisions (that are located at the
headquarters). The  Project manager argues that: ‘ The role of the
project manager is to facilitate the relationship between different
departments and let their constraints and needs be expressed’.
ALLCAPT BOARDS ARIANE V WITH SEP
The decision to launch Ariane V was made in the 1980s.
This was a big project for ESA (European Space Agency). The
French group CNES (National Centre for Space Studies) opted for a
new design for the Vulcain engines, using liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen, together with a new design for the turbo-pumps. New
instrumentation capable of  functioning in extremely harsh
conditions was needed to provide information on the engine’s
internal conditions and deliver this data to the computers controlling
the launcher. However, as the engine itself was yet to be developed
by SEP, no precise data about the temperature of burned gases and
cryogenic fluids, the pressure, the vibration level and the velocity
was available, except those provided by numerical modelling and
simulations based on extremely simplified hypotheses.
SEP wished to use both thermocouples, smaller and easier to
integrate in less accessible locations in the engine, and resistance
temperature detectors (RTDs), which are much more precise. Still,
‘contrary to aircrafts, there was no knowledge about what kind of
measurement will be accurate, and in which parts of the engine one
should insert the sensors’ (AED manager) .The thermocouples and11
RTDs were designed to measure cryogenic temperatures of liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen (about – 150°C) which are the
propellants used in Vulcain engine. These propellants are pumped
from reservoirs by turbo-pumps and atomised into the combustion
chamber through several hundred co-axial atomisers.
No existing sensor was able to operate in the expected
conditions. Allcapt was contracted to develop the required sensors.
Given the uncertainty of the conditions within the engine, it was
difficult to specify  a priori the characteristics the sensors would
require. Conversely, the development of the Ariane engine required
sensor information to ensure safety constraints were met. Thus,
development of the engine and sensors necessarily proceeded
together, step by step. Modifications of the engine often required
changes in the specifications of the sensors.
As thermocouple technology was relatively well understood,
while the  RTDs raised more concern, I will focus on the
development of the latter.
Winning the SEP Contract
As for more than 15 years  Allcapt had a privileged
relationship with SNECMA, the company was encouraged by
SNECMA to consider  SEP’s bid. Specialised in processing
thermocouples since the 1970s,  Allcapt was, indeed, a credible
candidate:
‘The companies able to compete in this niche market were
not more than three or four. German manufacturers were
quickly eliminated, I guess because they were not really
interested in this operation. And let’s not forget that we were
proposing one of the best quality/price ratio’ ( Production
manager).12
Allcapt’s management took advantage of the existence of
Icapto, the above-mentioned Spanish company affiliated to Allcapt.
The Materials manager states that:
‘ESA’s European funds had been distributed mainly to
countries such as France and Germany. Spain, Portugal,
among other European countries, were far from getting their
‘share’. When Allcapt’s managers applied for the SEP bid,
they specified Icapto as the supplier of required sensors. In
that way SEP had subcontracted a Spanish company.
Allowing Spain to participate gave us the advantage’.
There is a consensus about the importance of the
involvement of Spain,  via  Icapto, in the  Ariane V project, and
according to the Production manager, ‘Allcapt has been contracted
for political, as well as for purely technical reasons’. The same
strategy was used for the RTDs, when, ‘after CNES decided to create
a French supplier, a second campaign was launched by SEP’. Having
already been contracted for thermocouples, and proposing, once
again, a good quality/cost ratio,  Allcapt was, once again a good
candidate. The company also demonstrated the feasibility of its
proposal:  Allcapt would be assisted by one of the company’s
American suppliers (hereafter referred to as Nimco), who designed
RTDs for industrial applications. Once again SEP was informed that
Icapto would be involved. The Materials managers states that:
‘The strategy was again effective and  Allcapt, through
Icapto, was successful. RTDs processed at the (AB) plant are
controlled by Icapto because they have a cryostat. This is a13
technology used to control the sensors at various
temperature levels and to calibrate them at cryogenic
temperatures’
8.
However, there was one additional concern:  Allcapt was,
since 1972, an affiliate of an American holding, while SEP was
searching for a European company:
‘SEP tried to learn more about the exact nature of our
relationship with the American owner. We told them Allcapt
is completely under French jurisdiction and that both Allcapt
and Icapto are European companies. We had to persuade
SEP that our link to the US company was purely financial.
No company owned by this holding specialises in sensors
and so, none of them is able to copy and exploit the
technology we developed’ (Production manager).
Different Stages of ‘Problem-Solving’
As Allcapt, backed by SNECMA, was used to manufacturing
well-known products, the new contract forced Allcapt to deal with
uncertainty and complexity. To adapt, Allcapt required a period of
transition. Companies, as well as individuals, are known to have
some routine or standard solutions when faced with new problems
(March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and Marc,
1988). Only when they fail companies seek new solutions and accept
the uncertainty that results. Indeed,  Allcapt initially employed
problem solving methods well known to the company before new
solutions progressively emerged.
                                                          
8 ‘First it was stated that RTDs would be processed and controlled by
Icapto, once the prototypes would be developed at (AB) plant’. Later,
Allcapt’s managers eventually decided that as Icapto had no competency
and know-how in manufacturing RTDs. Icapto is now sub-contracting the
manufacturing of RTDs to Allcapt. ‘What Icapto’s staff do is just to control
the RTDs and to calibrate the sensors at 20 Kelvin with their cryostat’
(Materials manager)14
Routine Solutions
To deal with uncertainty, Allcapt initially (in 1988-89) chose
platinum resistance  RTDs, developed by  Nimco as the best
candidate, ‘because to wind platinum wire on ceramic mandrels, and
to heat them to high temperatures requires that the platinum and the
ceramics have the same coefficient of thermal expansion.  Nimco
developed the ceramic having this property. However, early
formulations of this were not sufficiently resistant to required
conditions’ (Materials manager). Allcapt then tried to adapt these
RTDs using existing know-how through licensing.
Not only did Allcapt’s management try to adapt an existing
technology, but they also tried to adapt existing skills within the
company. Amongst available  in situ human resources and skills,
Allcapt’s management decided to train an electronics operator, used
to handling very tiny components and wires. As the sensing element
of the RTD consisted of platinum wire 17 microns in diameter,
wound around cylindrical ceramic mandrels, she was an ideal
candidate to be trained in the US at Nimco, to become a ‘prototype
technician’.
Competence Building
There are several models of learning. One of them rests upon
tacit knowledge, where formal, written information is an inadequate
source (Collins 1992, pp.56-58, see also Bagla-Gökalp 1996a, 1996b
and note 6). Manufacturing reliable sensors draw mainly upon this
model:
‘Processing RTDs is the most specific job we have at the
(AB) plant. It’s impossible to totally formalise and codify the
operations. We hired two people to process the sensing
element and it took our prototype technician six months to
train them’ (Materials manager).
As it was not easy to standardise the RTD manufacturing,
one possible solution was to always assign this job to the same15
operators, and this was indeed included in the contract. The
Materials manager confirms that ‘the SEP project is the only one
with assigned operators’. The tacit knowledge of these operators was
the guarantee for the reliability of the product, and SEP maintained
some control over the processing of the sensors by controlling the
identity of persons who manufacture them.
Searching for New Technology
In 1990, after a two-year development period, Allcapt’s
RTDs failed in tests specified by SEP:
‘The ceramics and the glass used were not sufficiently
strong. Unfortunately, Nimco was not interested in investing
any more resources for this product. We had to find another
partner’ (Production manager).
The production manager contacted an engineering school
(hereafter referred to as NCIC) in a neighbouring region, which
specialised in the development of industrial ceramics. Two scholars,
S1 and S2 from NCIC were offered grants: S1 for the glass covering
the mandrels, and S2 to improve the ceramic mandrels. As the
problem of the glass was relatively easy to solve, I will focus on the
ceramic mandrels. S2 was expected to formulate a new powder with
the appropriate proportions. Allcapt was short on time and had to
push S2 to accelerate the process.
Managing to Meet a Different Culture
Industry is often suspicious of academic researchers of using
part of the money to do basic research, hence the importance of close
monitoring:
‘We organised monthly meetings to interview S2, to follow
step by step the results of his research and evaluate them.
Because if you let a laboratory go without proper reporting16
for six months, you will never know how things are evolving’
(Production manager).
Nevertheless, S2 was not working full time on this project,
letting students and trainees deal with it, because ‘ S2 would not
recognise the importance of deadlines and the impact of a delay on
the company. Academic researchers don’t necessarily focus on one
particular aspect. As soon as they observe something interesting,
they are eager to pursue in this direction’ (Materials manager).
As the RTDs had to be validated by SEP in 1995, in order to
have a full-time researcher on the SEP project, Allcapt contracted, in
1992, the present materials manager, who was recently graduated
from NCIC and who had been a student of S2. He became a
‘translator’
9, helping two different cultures to communicate:
‘S2 was supervising the technical aspects of my job, but I
was employed by Allcapt. Thanks to this double-identity it
was easier to me to communicate Allcapt’s constraints to S2’
(Materials manager).
The difficulty to adapt the product to the needs of industry was the
next major problem:
‘At NCIC, you mix a powder with another, and process them
for 5 to 10 hours, in the hope that at some point, you get
what you were looking for. There is little fundamental
understanding. You always tinker. It was not necessary to
reproduce standard products. Once the product is developed
                                                          
9 For the concept of ‘translator’ see : Aitken 1976, 1985 and Gökalp 1992,
1994. A sociological approach developed at the Centre for Sociology of
Innovation by French sociologists such as M. Callon and B. Latour at
l’Ecole des Mines in Paris use also the concepts of ‘translation’ and
‘translator’, the latter referring to a social actor who is at the core of an
innovation process that can be stabilised thanks to his/her translation when
the various, human as well non-human actors, are aligned around the same
definition of a project (see, Callon 1986, Latour 1987).17
and designed, NCIC researchers and scholars considered
that their job was over. They were not interested in industrial
or standard processing of the product. I know what I am
talking about because I worked 10 months with S2 on the
ceramic mandrels, for the SEP project. S1 had the same
attitude. He is our supplier for the glass covering the
ceramic mandrels, but he will not become enthusiastic over
processing it for us’ (Materials manager).
From Laboratory to Industry
When the ceramics were finally adapted to Allcapt’s needs,
‘the transfer of technology from the laboratory to industry was the
second step’ ( Materials manager). In June 1993, the machines,
ovens, and other technology were bought to process the ceramic
mandrels at (AB) plant, after adapting them to  Allcapt’s specific
needs. Still, to process standard products was not that easy, and ‘the
mastering of the various stages of the production and of the details of
the operations in order to produce a consistent powder and ceramics
took some time’ (Materials manager). The materials manager then
left Allcapt, as his contract ended.
During the development period,  Allcapt managers were
aware that the testing of their sensors would be crucial, ‘ as
simulating the conditions inside the engine was impossible, separate
tests for vibration and temperature were performed, even though all
of these parameters would impact simultaneously the sensor under
real operating conditions’ (AED manager).
In 1993, after testing, the first ‘critical review for product
specificities’ (définition du produit) of the RTD was not accepted by
SEP. The platinum was still not resistant enough and the sensor
presented an insulation problem. In 1994, Allcapt decided to recruit
the present materials manager as project manager, to deal with the
development of the RTD. With the assistance of the product quality
person, he conducted product validation studies:
‘It was a great learning experience. Her method was
interesting: to cut the product in a multitude of components18
and parts, to see where the problem is coming from. Before
that, I concentrated on the mandrels. I then realised that this
was just a very small part of the RTD. I got a broader view
of the product. The number of operations to process the
RTDs was amazing. Controlling the process required expert
understanding of each process step’( Materials manager).
It appeared to Allcapt’s management that there would be no
perfect sensor, because ‘ this is not an exact science: there are
several parameters to control such as resistance, conductance, and
strength; one cannot have them all within a single material. One has
to find a compromise among these parameters. It’s a genuine trial
and error process’ (Industrial manager). According to the Materials
manager:
‘If you want to improve the glass, and eliminate the bubbles,
you have to leave it in the oven for a longer period.
However, this will damage the platinum wire’.
Even today, only slightly over one-third of the total RTD
output is delivered to the customer as ‘usable’:
‘During the initial periods, when SEP was waiting for 60 or
even 80  RTDs, we would give them only 30, because of
processing failures. We were doing exactly the same
operations, and it was difficult to understand why sometimes
we would have good products, and sometimes we would fail.
Things are getting better but we know that we have to accept
losing 30 per cent of our products’ (Materials manager).
Negotiating Design and Accuracy
Allcapt’s managers rapidly learned that innovation is always
a compromise:19
‘For a new sensor to be designed, those who develop the
launcher will ask for the best and the most rapidly feasible
sensor, those who work directly on the engine will ask for the
most accurate and reliable sensor that is easy to use. The
corporate finance division will ask for the least expensive
sensor. These are people with different (and sometimes,
conflicting) concerns. Ultimately they must negotiate. The
final decision is always a compromise’ ( Production
manager)
Negotiating with suppliers, and particularly with customers,
is also very important as ‘ the final design is a compromise that
blends scientific, economic, commercial, human relational and
managerial aspects’ ( Production manager). Not only  RTDs
necessitated a compromise among the parameters as expressed by the
industrial manager, but they also forced people dealing with various
aspects of the innovation to negotiate, in accordance with the
expectations of those who analyse the technology as a ‘social
construction’ (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch eds, 1987; Mackenzie 1990,
Mackenzie and Wajcman eds, 1985).
When the specification (‘définition’) of the product has been
refused by SEP, according to the  Materials manager,  Allcapt’s
managers were under great pressure:
‘I think SEP was ready to abandon us. We had to prove our
trustworthiness. You easily feel when your customer no
longer trusts you. The problem reached the highest levels of
hierarchy’ (Materials manager).
The major problem was the pressure level set to test the
sensors. To Allcapt’s management it was clear that SEP should
accept to lower it. There was no option, indeed, to delay Ariane V
launch:
‘Given technological and time constraints, processing new
RTDs that match  SEP’s expectations was not feasible.20
Industrial culture means that to be able to innovate you have
to accept some flexibility’ (AED manager).
At this point, the question was not technological but
political, and it was the AED manager who solved the
problem:
‘By experience I know that you always have to negotiate at
the management level. The engineer who calculated the
pressure levels the sensors would face was a young
theoretician, not very well acquainted with practical
problems. It is very hard to negotiate with engineers when
they imagine that if they lower the standards, they will lose
their credibility, and this may damage their career. If his
boss tells him to do this, he will be freed of the responsibility
if something goes wrong’ (AED manager).
Allcapt had to negotiate with SEP in order to lower the
pressure constraints by modifying the ‘measurement points’ (i.e. the
various locations in the engine where the temperature sensors were to
be placed) and the  AED manager knew that ‘ the instrumentation
division manager was the right person to negotiate with’. Moreover,
the AED manager ‘have known him for many years’ and ‘was able to
anticipate his reactions’. Together they sought the acceptable
solution: The initial pressure level in the measurement points
indicated by SEP engineer was 400 bar. After negotiations, the
maximal pressure was lowered to 240 bar, a level the RTD could
resist. The success of the compromise was evident when the product
was accepted in December1994, and Allcapt began the processing of
sensors in 1995.
BEING READY TO FACE EUROPE
The SEP project helped Allcapt’s managers to recognise that
a purely technical project does not exist. When they have been
contracted by SEP,  Allcapt’s managers understanding of the21
importance of Europe was limited to the political understanding that
to be more attractive for the contract, they should involve Icapto:
‘Allcapt processed sensors for Ariane V, a project funded by
ESA, co-ordinated and supervised by the CNES, and
functioning with engines developed by SEP, our direct
customer. Ariane V is more than a technical project. It is
also a political project. It has been decided that Ariane V
should be a truly, completely European launcher’
(Production manager).
Since then,  Allcapt’s understanding of Europe quickly
evolved, as the Technical manager states:
‘Europe brings you contracts, networks, the possibility to co-
operate with research centres and universities. This helps
SMEs to hire people with greater expertise and also PhDs
specialised on a given subject that is of interest to the
company. Everybody wins from these opportunities. You
learn who’s who, and who can help you to solve your
problem’.
Discovering all the Aspects of Complexity Simultaneously
According to Allcapt employees, working for SEP for RTD
innovation has been an invigorating experience. They are eager to
credit this project with helping Allcapt to discover new perspectives
and horizons. Not only because after this success they were more
confident, but also because they created a new environment, and
learnt how to raise funds to enhance the once ‘embryonic R&D’ unit:
‘In our company’s life, one can easily distinguish two
periods: before SEP, and after. We learnt a lot about the
complexity of networks: ESA, CNES, the Spanish
governmental agency who redirected the European funds to
Icapto, etc. SEP sub-contracted Allcapt who was licensed by
Nimco and this means that in some way SEP was sub-22
contracting to Nimco. This kind of ‘tri-partner relationship’
was an apprenticeship to complexity. Things got even more
complex when the first RTDs failed and when we contracted
NCIC. For the first time we worked with academic
researchers and learnt to co-operate with them. When we
were working for SNECMA, we wouldn’t know what it means
to have a relationship with other companies. It was a
relationship between two equivalent units or rather, between
two individuals with similar functions in each company. With
the SEP project we began to discover the complexity of our
relationship with our customers, and our customers’
customers’ (Production manager).
Coming from MATRA, the technical manager states that he
always knew that one cannot ignore Europe. Still, he recognised that
to  Allcapt staff who were used to working in a protected
environment, the SEP project could appear like a transition to
integrating the new European dimension:
‘The top management and I were moving in this direction.
The previous situation was dangerous, as SNECMA
represented more than 70 per cent of our sales. But one can
say that the success of the first experience with the SEP
project facilitated things a lot’ (Technical manager).
The production manager insists upon this aspect:
‘The arrival of new people in the ranks of top management
has been an important factor for the development of new
strategies. And when they understood that we had now
achieved a new level of maturity, they were more eager to
design new strategies’
The Materials manager has a very similar perspective:
‘Thanks to the SEP project, the reputation of Allcapt grew,
allowing the company to be entered into the European23
programme’s milieu. During the critical definition and
qualification reviews, the company’s management
established many connections and came to be known as a
reliable and serious company. It was easier to contract them
for new projects because of this positive image. They now
know who we are, that our products are reliable. I think this
greatly facilitated our technical manager’s job’.
If change concerns technical, human, and political aspects,
the cultural aspect is perceived as being the most important:
‘The SEP project has been pivotal: it changed our mentality.
We realised that we were able to deal with complex
assignments and that there was no reason to have any
inferiority complex. And we learnt to accept risk and
uncertainty. We learnt to analyse situations, to make choices,
and to accept the entire responsibility of our choices. This
was a huge cultural change’ (Production manager).
Acquiring New Competencies
The SEP contract has been an opportunity to acquire new
technology and knowledge. One of the consequences of this project
was the ISO 9001 approval in 1992 making sure that Allcapt meets
the new European standards.  Allcapt’s management also learnt to
take more initiatives in exploiting new resources:
‘Our top-management is eager to benefit from European
institutions. They are really active in writing proposals’
(Materials manager).
Finally the SEP project generated, directly or indirectly,
several jobs, including five at the (AB) plant, according to a new
development strategy:
‘When we develop a product, if we need some expertise,
know-how or technology, we first try to sub-contract. When24
we have the means to buy the technology and hire the people
who have mastered it, then we integrate them’ (Production
manager).
Technical Aspect: Developing New Know-how
Once the staff learnt by doing, various improvements to the
sensors were made by substituting more resistant alloys for the
metals, and by more carefully insulating the wires:
‘We did more than copying drawings and instructions from
licenses. We acquired a competency in processing both the
sensing elements of the temperature sensor and the
materials. The SEP project has been a spring-board for us.
We now manufacture our own sensitive parts and continue to
work on the composition of the ceramics. Moreover, we
developed variations of the original sensors that allows us to
adapt them to the specific needs of customers such as Rolls
Royce’ (Materials manager).
The funds collected from the successful SEP project were
reinvested in new technology as well as in new expertise. One such
example was the acquisition of specialised software for modelling.
For the RTDs designed for Vulcain 1, the company sub-contracted a
Belgian company. In 1997, Allcapt invested in this technology and
the engineer in charge with modelling has been trained to master and
use the computer programmes:
‘The dynamic finite elements programme Pro  Mechanica,
combining a set of measurements and calculations related to
the RTDs, is now used with the CAD. Pro Engineer allows to
obtain 3D pictures of all the parts and components. We do25
much better than the Belgian company: We’re closer to
reality’
10 (Project manager).
The expertise the company sought from their R&D people
also changed, as one can see from the changes in recruitment
policies. While ‘initially they possessed a very general knowledge
structure and would tinker with drawings to reach a result according
to a product structure, today they all are specialised with specific
domains of expertise, e.g. materials, optics, etc., and work according
to an expertise structure’ (Technical manager). The adoption of ISO
9001 would not have been possible without this expertise. The path
followed by the project managers has been the reverse, as they have
been transformed into multi-skilled people.
Relational aspects: Communication with the Environment
During the product development process, project managers
are increasingly expected to co-operate with scientists, as well as
with the customer who consequently deals with the same person for
every aspect of his problem. To allow  Allcapt to be involved in
European programmes, now project managers must also be fluent in
English:
‘All of these aspects changed our recruitment policy. If you
look at the background and career of our first project
managers, you can see the evolution: 15 or even 10 years
ago, they would be promoted from the ranks of good
technicians, who had a very good insight of the product.
Today, the technical dimension is less important and we
stress that they have to be very good communicators, inside
as well as outside’ (Production manager).
                                                          
10 This is consistent with Thomke et al’s. approach to the role of computer
simulation during the experimental cycle: Thomke et al. 1998, p. 320.26
Finally, ‘interactivity’ and ‘permanent adaptation’ became
key words. To this end,  Allcapt’s managers and engineers keep
themselves informed about ongoing research on topics and subjects
that are of interest to the company:
‘We have to work with university and scientific research
laboratories, who are more prompt to communicate their results in
meetings and scientific literature, contrary to the industrial milieu
where the culture and attitudes are based upon secrecy’ ( AED
manager).
Becoming Aggressive
Allcapt’s management is keenly aware of the fact that being
a SME is, to some extent, a handicap:
‘To collect European funding you have to be married with
big companies who get the largest fraction of the money.
There are incredible obstacles imposed by these large firms.
Also, European structures and institutions are not eager to
deal with SMEs because they try to reduce the number of
partners. They prefer to distribute the money to a big
company who in turn will give some crumbs to the SMEs’
(Production manager).
The Technical manager proposes some solutions:
‘The  SMEs must develop new structures to be able to
compete with big companies. One can mention, for example,
the Le Richelieu Committee, which includes French SMEs in
the defence industry. Le Richelieu joined an association of
similar high-tech industries based in various European
countries, to become a large association of smaller
companies. It’s a new experience. These kind of solutions are
being developed. It’s important to help each other, to share
expertise, information, and other resources, with
laboratories, and other partners. Of course, it’s not always
that easy. When you have to develop a common project, you27
are often concerned that some of the partners will really
work hard on the project and make progress, while others
will take the project as an opportunity to benefit from
European funding, without being really involved. So you
have to fight continuously’.
Allcapt struggles also in order to be innovative and
competitive:
‘We sometimes get stuck having to satisfy specific customers.
We have to listen to them and try immediately to develop
exactly what they need, but they are loyal up to the day they
find a cheaper product elsewhere. Each year we have to
negotiate the contracts, adapt ourselves and integrate the
importance of quality and cost’ (Production manager).
An aggressive strategy has been adopted, to win new
customers in the European market. To this end, the  Technical
manager presented their sensors to Rolls-Royce:
‘As we worked for SNECMA, we thought that we had to go to
other European engine builders. We decided to target Rolls-
Royce, because Rolls-Royce, aside from being European,
was the second most important aircraft engine manufacturer.
I can tell you that we failed: They were not interested at all
in our product. We analysed the situation and assumed that
maybe the commercial arguments we presented were not the
right way to convince them. So, we decided to try more
technical arguments. We presented the high-tech aspect of
the product, the teams who process it, the maintenance
services, etc. We even manufactured prototypes for them to
try. We created a ‘service’ relationship. This lasted for three
years. After that, they were ready to recognise our expertise,
but they still wouldn’t go into business with us. But at least,
they understood exactly what we were able to do. So when
they were co-ordinating a European programme, they
involved us in this programme and simultaneously, they28
proposed that we become a partner for a second European
programme, where we were given an even more important
role. Of course we won’t stop there. We have other projects.
Despite their handicaps, SMEs also have some advantages
such as the rapidity of decisions, flexibility, and the ability to
motivate people’.
This was  Allcapt’s first participation in a true European
programme. Today, Allcapt is co-ordinating and leading a European
programme, with 13 participants, all of them European companies,
universities and research centres. After being acquainted with
European programmes,  Allcapt now participates also in a project
aiming to develop in the (AB) city a strong R&D and manufacturing
activity concerning a large variety of sensors.
CONCLUSION
Allcapt may be considered as a ‘learning organisation’.
Problems are solved step by step. Factors such as intuition,
negotiation and networking talents ( Bagla-Gökalp 1998, Hastings
1993), and trust
11, constitute an important aspect of the company’s
problem solving methods. These factors largely contributed to their
success with technological innovation
12. Thanks to this innovation,
the company learned a great deal about handling complex problems
and the associated uncertainties. They were able to develop a more
aggressive outlook as well. Thus, innovation modified more than the
technology the company can access. It initiated a cultural change.
This irreversible change helped  Allcapt to achieve unprecedented
                                                          
11 Trust has become a major theme in managerial studies. See for example
Blomquist 1998, Krieger 1988.
12 For analyses of innovation (theoretical approaches and case studies) see:
Aydalot and Keeble, eds. 1988, Biemans, Branscomb and Keller, eds. 1998;
Bucciarelli 1996,  Dodgson and  Bessant 1996, Fountain 1998,  Gregersen
1992, Lundwall, ed. 1992, Miettinen 1996, Murray 1997, Senker and Sharp
1998, Von Hippel 1977, 199829
levels of flexibility and responsiveness. All of these factors
contributed to the success the company is now enjoying with
European programmes.30
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